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INTRODUCTION 
The current research on hedging in futures markets is characterized by a large number of 
excellent specialized papers. These papers typically focus on rather narrow topics, often 
assuming that the motivation to hedge is risk reduction, or finding an optimal balance between 
risk and return. These papers do not typically address the influence of the commercial 
environment on the firm’s motivation to hedge. Powers (1994) recently stressed in this Journal 
the importance of addressing the fundamental question of why firms hedge and futures 
exchanges exist. This paper attempts to contribute to this question. It is argued here that one of 
the motivations to use futures contracts is contract relationship management. A conceptual 
framework is developed to show that futures exchanges provide facilitating services that can be 
used to establish a successful contract relationship among various parties despite differences in 
contract-type preferences between firms. It is argued that the service provided by futures 
exchanges complement the contract terms in a contract relationship such that it yields a 
communally preferred contracting relationship. This paper does not pretend to establish the 
hedging theory. Rather, it presents one explanation of why firms hedge, and as such it 
complements other theories. There are several motivations for decision makers to use futures 
contracts, and hence the rationale for having futures markets. The role of futures contracts as 
facilitating long-term contractual relationships is addressed here by taking the perspective of 
firms engaged in contract relationships. It is shown that futures exchanges provide services that 
help solve conflicts in the contract relationships between firms.  
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This paper proceeds as follows. First the theories on the motivation to use futures 
markets are reviewed. Then a framework is introduced in which the commercial environment, 
reflected by the firm’s contract relationships with other firms, is the central focus of attention. 
The role of power in a contract relationship and the conflicts that might arise between firms 
within the contract relationship are examined. Subsequently, it is shown how the services of 
futures exchanges can be used to solve these conflicts. Based on this framework it is argued that 
one of the motivations underlying futures usage is conflicts that might arise from differences 
between firms regarding their preferred contracting relationship. A field study conducted in an 
agricultural marketing channel illustrates the proposed hedging concept. Finally, the proposed 
theory is compared with the ones reviewed and the commonalties and differences between them 
are discussed. 
 
VIEWS ON HEDGING: A REVIEW 
This paper exclusively focuses on hedging theories that are related to the motivation to use 
futures markets, hence, theories regarding futures price behavior or price information are not 
elaborated. Several authors, amongst others, Cootner (1960), Gray and Rutledge (1971), Goss 
and Yamey (1978), Kamara (1982), Williams (1986), Blank (1989), Malliaris (1997) and 
Carter (1999), have done an excellent job providing such reviews. The review presented here 
serves as a background to which the proposed hedging motivation model is evaluated.1  
 
                                                                 
1 The paper does not aim to make a complete review of all hedging theories developed in the literature. 
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Price Insurance Theory 
In the early days of research in futures markets, the view on the role of these markets was 
straightforward and simple. Hoffman stated “hedging is shifting risk” (1932, p.382) and Smith 
said “hedging enables hedgers to insure against the risk of price fluctuations” (1922, p.81). 
Previously, in 1919, Marshall dissiminated this view by stating “the hedger does not speculate: 
he insures” (Marshall, 1919, p.260). Keynes (1930), Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939) 
discussed hedging in terms of risk avoidance and insurance. In this view any loss made by the 
hedger on the completed hedged transaction represents an insurance premium paid to the risk-
assuming speculator. Until the 1940’s this price risk motivation argument was the theoretical 
explanation of why firms use futures exchanges, or as Blau (1944, p.1) stated “commodity 
futures exchanges are market organisations specially developed for facilitating the shifting of 
risks due to unknown future changes in commodity prices; i.e., risks which are of such a nature 
that they cannot be covered by means of ordinary insurance”. In the post-war era this view 
would be challenged by several researchers, the first being Working. 
 
Earnings Returns Theory  
Working (1953) challenged the idea of risk insurance by arguing that it is the pursuit of profit 
through the exploitation of (expected) changes in the basis, that is, the exploitation of 
opportunities for profit presented by the prospective movement of prices in the futures market 
relative to the movement in the cash market. In this view, hedging was primarily a sort of 
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arbitrage, to be engaged in only when the hedger perceived a promising opportunity for profit.2 
In later work Working renounced his earlier position. In 1967 he asserted that (short) hedgers 
tend to lose money to speculators on their hedge transactions in the futures market and they do 
so even during periods in which futures prices in the market in question have fallen. The 
explanation was the “dips” or “bulges” that tend to occur when hedgers sell or buy futures 
contracts. Hence, Working’s hedgers had to pay a price to speculators, that is, they incur 
execution costs for the prompt carrying out of their sale or purchase transaction. This 
explanation links back to the price insurance theory: the reason for hedgers to have their orders 
executed expeditiously is to reduce the interval in which their inventories are left uncovered, 
exposed to the risk of price change.  
The adoption of the portfolio theory approach in the 1960’s to decisions in futures 
markets rehabilitated the risk reduction notion in hedging theory. 
 
Portfolio Theory 
Using portfolio theory to explain the activity of participants in futures trading once again sets risk 
in the center of why one should hedge. This theory contributes by making explicit the risk-return 
trade off to be assessed by the hedger in each situation. Stein (1961) and Johnson (1960) used 
the foundation of the portfolio theory as grounded by Markowitz (1959) to explain hedging. In 
the portfolio approach a hedger is viewed as maximizing the expected utility derived from a 
                                                                 
2 In the view of Working (1953), hedging in futures consists of making a contract to buy or sell on standard 
terms, established and supervised by a commodity exchange, as a temporary substitute for an intended later 
contract to buy or sell on other terms. Working (1962) distinguished between several different categories of 
hedging: carrying charge hedging, operational hedging, selective hedging, anticipatory hedging and pure 
risk avoidance hedging. See Kamara (1982) for a detailed discussion. 
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portfolio of cash and futures. Several researchers have drawn on this framework (e.g. Danthine, 
1978; Holthausen, 1979; Anderson and Danthine, 1983).  
Williams (1986) challenged the portfolio theory by arguing that the riskiness in 
production, transport, and processing is the reason for firms to hold inventories and to use 
futures contracts. These risks in the availability of commodities are unlike the individual risks 
which are at the center of the portfolio theory, which assumes that individuals who diversify or 
transfer risk to others can eliminate most of the risk. Williams (1986) argued that the important 
risks (availability of commodities) are hard to diversify. Moreover, he argued that the portfolio 
theory of hedging always begins with the initial position of all inventory unhedged, and hence is 
extremely sensitive to what is taken as the predetermined position. Stein (1986) argued that the 
portfolio theory implies that investors hold risky assets in their portfolio in the same proportions 
as they are available in the market. Stein then argued that this assumption does not apply to 
futures because the open interest is equally divided between long and short traders. 
Furthermore, he argued that futures contracts are short-lived securities, whose quantities are 
determined by the volume of transactions in the cash and forward markets, whereas in the 
portfolio theory prices adjust to clear the market for fixed quantities of securities. Hartzmark 
(1987) and Peck and Nahmias (1989) found that actual positions in futures markets were 
unrelated to portfolio-recommended strategies. The absence of a relationship between actual 
hedges and the optimal hedge positions derived from strategies based on portfolio models are 
robust. In these studies modification of price expectations did not change the results. 
In his review on issues in futures markets, Kamara (1982, p.263) stated that “the 
hedger’s futures position is motivated partially by the desire to stabilize income and partially by 
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the desire to increase the expected profits”, thereby showing that the price insurance theory, the 
earnings return theory, and the portfolio theory all contributed to the understanding why firms 
hedge. So far, the theories didn’t take alternative risk reduction instruments into account. Telser 
(1981) shifted the perspective by contrasting the characteristics of futures exchanges with 
forward markets. 
 
Liquidity Theory 
Telser (1981) argued that organized futures markets exist because they are superior to informal 
forward markets. An organized futures market has elaborate written rules, standing committees 
for adjudicating disputes, and a limited membership. In contrast to futures contracts, forward 
contracts rely on the good faith of individual parties. Also, in contrast to standardized futures 
contracts, a typical forward contract is tailored through substantial negotiations to the individual 
parties and the particular lot of the commodity. Therefore, they cannot be offset by identical 
contracts, and there is no scope for the advantages of clearinghouses and settlement by the 
payment difference. Through their rules and standardization futures provide liquidity and 
eliminate counter-party risk. Telser (1981, p. 1) stated that “an organized market facilitates 
trade among strangers”. Also in Telser’s view the motivation to use futures exchanges is risk 
reduction, but he recognizes that there are other instruments available to the firm which can 
reduce risk. Telser argues that even if one accepts the price insurance theory, it does not explain 
why an organized futures market is necessary in order to accommodate hedging. Telser argued 
that a merchant who wishes to avoid the price risks of holding inventories can do so without an 
organized futures market, namely by entering into forward transactions in the cash market. In 
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this view the motivation to use futures contracts is not primary driven by the firm’s desire to 
reduce risk, but by the institutional characteristics of the futures exchange itself.  
So far, the theories view hedging as a transaction in the futures markets. Williams 
(1986) focused not only on the hedging transaction itself, but also on the whole hedging 
operation, when he developed his loan markets theory. 
 
Loan Markets Theory 
Williams (1986) departs from the question of why firms hold inventories in order to understand 
why firms use futures exchanges.3 He argued that firms hold inventory as a response to the cost 
of producing, moving, and processing commodities quickly. To borrow a commodity implicitly 
through a hedging operation involving a futures contract is one method of obtaining accessibility 
for a stretch of time.4 Williams (1986) views hedging in the context of implicit loan markets. He 
showed that a short hedging operation, the spot purchase of a commodity and its simultaneous 
sale for future delivery, equals to borrowing a commodity over an interval of time while lending 
money. Likewise, he showed that a long hedging operation is an implicit forward loan of a 
commodity. Hence, he concluded that a futures market is primarily part of an implicit loans 
market.5 In his view a firm does not first buy its inventory on the spot market, and then, after 
                                                                 
3 Working (1949) answered the question of holding inventories in his theory of the supply storage. In this 
theory dealers are willing to supply storage, which they are willing to do at times at negative return because 
of the convenience yield of holding inventories. 
4 He argued that regardless of whether firms have nonlinearities in their utility functions (resulting in risk 
aversion or risk seeking behavior), the nonlinearities in production are important to futures markets. Even 
commodity dealers who are risk neutral, and are faced with consumers who pressure to move and process 
commodities quickly, have reasons to use futures markets. Interesting is that for Williams’ research, risk 
attitude plays a role, although in this case it is a derived risk aversion (e.g., the risk aversion of consumers).  
5 Williams showed the economic effect of a hedging operation in the context of a repurchase agreement. In a 
short hedging operation the hedger buys the commodity in the cash market for immediate delivery and sells 
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contemplating the riskiness of its position, hedges with a short sale of a futures contract as 
assumed in the portfolio theory of hedging. Rather, Williams’s theory views the trades as if they 
were one. The contribution of futures markets is to be an organized part of an implicit loan 
market for commodities. A functioning loan market for commodities improves the allocation of 
reserves over time and among those holding stocks at any one moment of time. A loan market 
(read futures market) directs stocks to the firm whose need for them is most immediate. Such 
improvements in the allocation of reserves effectively lowers the price of holding stocks. In this 
view a spot commodity is a bundle of two characteristics: access to the good over some period 
of time and the right to future use beginning at the end of that period. The contribution of futures 
markets in this view is to accommodate these two separate markets, a market for accessibility, 
and one for the commodity’s future use. With a futures market, the argument goes, a firm buying 
a good on the spot market can sell its right to that commodity in the future by contracting to 
deliver in the future. The firm is left with only what it really desires, namely accessibility over the 
first period. The theory of implicit loan markets predicts that commodities with inflexibility in 
production, transportation, and processing are most likely to develop active futures trading, the 
insurance view of futures markets would predict that those with the most volatile prices would 
have futures markets.6 
Interesting in Williams’ view is that he focussed not only on the futures transaction, but 
on the whole hedging operation, of which the transaction in the futures market is just a part. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the commodity for future delivery on a futures exchange. The hedger is pledging to buy and then sell back, 
hence the hedger is enacting a repurchase agreement. Through this repurchase agreement the hedger 
borrows the commodity and lends the money. 
6 Williams (1986) wrote in terms of commodities. Extensions of his theory into financials is beyond the nature 
and scope of this paper. 
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paper elaborates on this view, and focuses on the decision-making behavior of firms in the real 
markets, recognizing that a firm belongs to a marketing channel in which the firm interacts with 
various other firms. The focus of attention will be directed to contracts between firms, which 
result in deliveries and acceptance of commodities. That is, the paper focuses on the heart of 
any firm’s operation: the firm’s contract relationships (that generate the flow of commodities to 
the firm (e.g., inputs) and the flow of commodities from the firm (e.g., outputs)). 
 
A NEW HEDGING FRAMEWORK 
This paper takes a positive perspective on hedging rather than a normative one. It does not 
come up with optimal hedging strategies, instead it shows how contract-relationship 
management induces a motivation for using futures markets. The relationships of firms with other 
ones are “formalized” in contract relationships. Often, these contract relationships are long term. 
For example, the grain elevator selling grain to the same group of millers year after year.7 It is, 
as will be shown below, this chain of contracts between firm A and firm B that under special 
circumstances will be sustained if futures exchanges are available. The proposed theory starts by 
looking at the contract initiation process between firms when marketing their outputs and buying 
their inputs. More specifically, the paper first focuses on the different elements of a contract 
between two firms, after which it focuses on one particular contract term: the pricing scheme. 
Based on the pricing term the paper classifies contracts into those that determine the price when 
                                                                 
7 There can be several reasons to trade with the same partners: location, trust, known quality of the product 
delivered (or requested), etc. Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (1999) showed the importance for such 
relationship in manufacturing type of industries. 
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the contract is initiated as opposed to those where the price is established at the moment the 
contract is closed (the moment of delivery or acceptance of the commodity). In the case that 
firm A and B agree on all contract terms, including the pricing scheme, a contract relationship is 
established.8 However, in the case that the two firms disagree on the pricing scheme, even 
though they agree on all the other contract terms, a conflict in their relationship may occur. The 
paper then shows that the power balance regarding the price discovery process between the 
two trading partners is an important factor in determining the final outcome of the contract 
relationship (e.g., no contract, a forced cash contract relationship or a forced forward contract 
relationship). It will be shown how power influences the contracting relationship between firms. 
Next, the paper shows that one of the motivations underlying futures usage are “conflicts” that 
might arise from different contract preferences between firms. 
 
Contractual Framework 
The types of contracts that exist between firms characterize their relationships. A contract 
minimally defines the place of delivery, time of delivery, quantity and quality of the product or 
service and the pricing scheme (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 1991). The pricing scheme may 
result in two distinctive outcomes: the price is determined at the moment of transaction based on 
the spot market, a so-called cash contract, or it can be determined at the moment the contract 
is negotiated, a so-called forward contract. Hence, a cash contract specifies at time t all the 
                                                                 
8 Most hedging theories focus on (commodity) dealers, who are buying and selling commodities to the 
lowest ask and highest bid respectively. This almost exclusive focus on dealers leads researchers away from 
the importance of long-term contract relationships, which are especially important in a manufacturing 
industry context. 
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elements of the contract, except for the price, which is determined at time t+1, the moment of 
actual acceptance or delivery, based on the (local) spot market. A forward contract specifies all 
the contract terms at time t for delivery or acceptance of the product at time t+1, including the 
price.9  
Contract relationships can be classified on the basis of these two broad classes of 
contracts and can be defined as a long-term relationship between two or more firms that is 
reflected in a chain of (cash or forward) contracts between them. This phenomenon is common 
in many industries. Most firms operate in a marketing channel in which they buy their inputs from 
firms with whom they have traded for long periods and sell their products to firms with whom 
they have also a long history of trading. Cheung (1983), Heide and George (1990), 
Noordewier, George and Nevin (1990) and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), amongst others, 
have shown that such relationships are rational because they induce low transaction costs, i.e., 
there are no search costs; costs to obtain information about the product offered by suppliers, 
product specification, or the needs of buyers.  
 
The Role of Power in Contract Relationships  
Power can be used to help achieve firms’ preferred contract relationships. Previous research 
focused on the power of one party (Gaski and Nevin, 1985; Kale, 1986; Frazier, Gill and Kale, 
1989). However, in the price discovery process, objective power counts less than the relative 
power perceived between firms (Anderson, Lodish and Weitz, 1987; Buchanan, 1992). In this 
                                                                 
9 Please note the conceptual difference between (cash and forward) contracts and futures contracts: 
contracts (cash or forward) involve the interaction between at least two firms whereas the use of futures 
contracts involves the interaction between the firm and the futures exchange. 
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paper, power refers to the ability of firms to influence the price discovery process. Firms able to 
exert power over the price formation process can do so on two dimensions. First, they can 
influence prices themselves, trying to realize the highest (lowest) price level possible when selling 
(purchasing). Second, firms can try to enforce their contract preference on the other firm. 
Hence, in terms of the contract framework, power refers to the firms’ ability to force either a 
cash contract or a forward contract relationship.  
Use of power, in this context, may result in a tense relationship and may lead to 
conflicts. In line with Lusch (1976) and Gaski (1984), contract conflict is the situation in which 
one firm perceives another firm to be engaged in behavior that is preventing or impeding him or 
her from achieving his or her own goals. The final result of exchange between firms (i.e., the use 
of cash or forward contracts) depends on the contract relationship preferences of the firms and 
the extent of power each firm has. For example, firm A has relative power over firm B and 
prefers a cash contract, whereas firm B prefers a forward contract. In such a situation firm A 
might use power to force a cash contracting relationship, which will result in a problematic 
relationship, because firm B will be dissatisfied with this situation (Frazier, Gill and Kale, 1989). 
The above described situation may also result in no relationship at all, particularly when firm B 
has other alternatives. 
In practice, however, a contract relationship is likely to take place even in cases in 
which firms disagree on the contract type relationship and there is a power imbalance. A well-
known example is that of agribusiness marketing channels where concentration in the upstream 
channel has shifted power and contract preferences are very diverse (e.g., Messinger and 
Narasimhan, 1995). 
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In the next section, it is shown that the use of futures can complement the price term of a 
contract, such that an exchange can be made, despite disagreement on contract type and a 
possible power imbalance. 
 
Resolving Contract Relationship Conflicts with Futures Contracts 
Contracts between firms can be complemented by services offered by third parties in order to 
improve the outcome of a contract relationship between firms. For example, the quality of the 
product may be checked by a third party, which ensures the buyer receives the correct product, 
and the seller avoids a breach-of-contract suit. This paper exclusively focuses on the pricing 
element of contracts. 
Suppose firm A is a wholesaler of a food raw material (such as meats and vegetables) 
and firm B is a processor of that food raw material. Assume further that the market for this raw 
material is very volatile and price fluctuations are large and unpredictable. The two firms know 
each other very well and know what to expect as seller and buyer. Moreover, both firms are 
located close to one another, so that delivery is simple for both firms. In this scenario, it would 
seem highly valuable for both firms to build a contract relationship, and hence exchange the raw 
material. This relationship might then be formalized by a contract that defines when, where, how 
much, and which quality the wholesaler will deliver to the processor.  
However, there is one element of the contract that needs further definition: the pricing 
scheme. Should they use a cash contract or a forward contract? Suppose the wholesaler prefers 
a cash contract relationship, one that enables him/her to adapt to the price changes of the raw 
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material.10 However, the processor with whom the wholesaler is trading may, for example, find 
the larger fluctuation in cash flows due to a cash contract relationship with the wholesaler 
undesirable, as it might not fit his/her goal for generating shareholder value, and hence prefers a 
forward contract relationship.11 The above situation might lead both firms away from an 
exchange and the establishment of a contract relationship, even though all the other elements of 
the exchange process (place, time, quantity and quality) are highly favorable. Or, it may lead to 
a forced cash contract relationship in the case that the wholesaler has relative power over the 
processor, or to a forced forward contract in the case the processor has relative power over the 
wholesaler. If in this case a contract relationship occurs, this relationship will not be satisfactory 
for one of the contract partners. Then, a conflict situation is likely to occur. 
 
Futures Exchanges Facilitating Contract Relationships  
The conflicts arising from different contract preferences of the firms may be solved by using the 
services provided by futures exchanges. These services can complement the pricing element of 
contracts such that contracting becomes interesting for both parties. The processor might, for 
example, use the hedging services offered by a futures exchange to complement the cash 
contracts preferred and enforced by the wholesaler. In this case the hedging service is a service 
through which the processor is offered the opportunity to buy products forward at a fixed price, 
                                                                 
10 The reason why a firm prefers a cash contract relationship or a forward relationship is not discussed here 
because it only leads indirectly to whether or not the hedging service is used. One may argue that risk and 
the firm’s risk attitude play an important role in the preference forming. 
11 Rappaport (1983), Christie and Vikram (1994), and Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey (1998) argued that 
reducing cash flow volatility contributes to shareholder value, as it results in lower costs of capital or 
discount rates, which results in higher net present values and hence higher shareholder value. 
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thereby not restricting him or her to have a cash contract relationship with the wholesaler.12 In 
general terms the hedging service can be defined as: a service through which a firm is offered 
the opportunity to buy or sell products forward at a fixed price, thereby not restricting 
the firm to engage in a cash contract relationship.  
So, in this example, the processor agrees not to set a forward contract, but a cash 
contract instead (according to the wholesaler’s desires). The processor then buys at time t (the 
same time that (s)he initiates the cash contract with the wholesaler) the same product in the 
futures market for delivery at time t+1 for a price agreed upon at time t (that is, the processor 
uses the hedging service offered by the exchange). Thus, the processor succeeds in fixing the 
price in advance, without demanding it from the wholesaler in their cash contract.13 Hedging 
services come at a financial cost. These costs are assumed to be carried by the relatively less 
powerful firm: it is the price the less powerful firm has to pay to sustain the contract relationship. 
The example illustrates that it is not necessary for firms to agree on all the terms of the 
contract in order to have a contract relationship. The following hypothesis can be stated:  
H1: If firm A is more powerful than firm B and firm A prefers cash contracts, whereas firm B 
prefers forward contracts, a cash contract relationship will occur and firm B buys 
hedging services to complement the price term of the cash contracts.14 
 
                                                                 
12 It can be shown that a cash contract combined with a futures contract yields a pay-off structure that is 
similar to a forward contract. 
13 Small differences might occur between the price for which the processor locks in the price in the futures 
market and the result of engaging in the cash contract and offsetting the futures position due to basis risk. 
This will in no way affect our conclusions. 
14 In the hypothesis the need for risk reduction may still play a role indirectly, as it may be the driving force 
why firm B prefers a forward contract relationship. 
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EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
The conceptual findings are illustrated with data from a field study characterized by companies 
that differ in both power and the preferred contract relationship. The objective is to illustrate the 
theoretical framework presented above and hence the important role of futures contracts on 
firms’ contracting relationships.  
 
Research Design 
 The empirical research is based on a two-channel-member framework in the domain of 
the Dutch pork industry. The Dutch hog-marketing channel is a representative marketing 
channel for many manufacturing industries. It is a channel with minimal co-ordination, minimal 
integration, and multiple members at multiple channel levels in a competitive environment with a 
wide range of heterogeneity among the channel members. In the Dutch pork industry, 
wholesalers collect hogs from hog farms and then sell them to meat processors, which are 
slaughterhouses that prepare and pack the meat. The Dutch pork industry consists of 150 
wholesalers and 65 processors. The relationship between wholesalers and processors is 
characterized by long-term contractual relationships. In order to investigate their contract 
preferences, their power, and whether or not they use futures, a sample was randomly drawn 
from directories kept by the Dutch Union of Livestock Wholesalers and the Dutch Pork 
Association. Before sending the request to participate in the computer-guided interview, the 
researchers checked whether the right person had been contacted. In the case of the 
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wholesalers this was either the managing director or the owner-manager, and in the case of the 
processing companies the person responsible for sales and purchasing was considered the right 
person. The interviews took place at the firm’s enterprise in the beginning of 1998. Response 
rates were 62% among wholesalers (52 respondents) and 78% among processors (39 
respondents). In this empirical domain the Amsterdam Exchanges and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange provide the relevant hedging services. 
 
Measures 
Contract Relationship: Cash versus Forward. The contract relationship was based on 
registering past behavior. In the interview, the terms “cash contract” or “forward contract” 
were not mentioned, because the respondents do not use these terms. Rather, the respondents 
indicated whether their main contract relationship was characterized by contracts that 
determined the price at the moment of delivery or acceptance (i.e., cash contracts) or at the 
moment the contracts were initiated (i.e., forward contracts).15  
Use of Futures Contracts. The use of futures contracts was based on past behavior, 
registering whether or not firms used futures contracts. During the interview it was made clear to 
the respondent that the research focused on the use of futures driven by business economic 
reasons only, thereby excluding futures use for other reasons that are not related to the firm’s 
management policy. 
                                                                 
15 In the Netherlands, firms in the pork industry usually use one main contract partner through whom the 
larger part of their products are being sold or bought. Dual-contract relationships are rare. During the 
interview it was indicated that the questions regarding contracts were referring to their main contract 
partner. 
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Power. The power perceived by the firm was measured by asking the firm to indicate 
the extent to which (s)he thinks that (s)he has power regarding the price discovery process, 
compared to the other firm (e.g., main trading partner). This was done by having the respondent 
distribute 100 points across him/herself and the other firm, where more points indicate more 
power. Putte van de, Hoogstraten and Meertens (1996) showed that distributing 100 points 
across alternatives provides a more accurate measure, while it forces respondents to make a 
trade-off between alternatives, thereby not assuming a particular comparison mechanism. 
 Trading Partner. Because the contracting relationship depends on the contract partner 
as well as the firm interviewed, respondents were asked to state the name of the firm with whom 
they have a primary contract relationship.  
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Analysis and Results 
The respondents are classified along the level of power, the preferred contract relationship, and 
the characteristics of their primary trading partner.16 A respondent was classified as having relatively 
low power when (s)he allocated less than 50 points to him/herself (and hence more than 50 points to 
the trading partner) and as having relatively high power when (s)he allocated more than 50 points to 
him/herself.  
To test the theory effectively and H1 in particularly, a domain was needed in which the main 
trading partner prefers a cash contract relationship and the firms under consideration have different 
levels of power. Therefore, only firms who are in a contract relationship in which the trading partner 
prefers cash contracting are included in the empirical illustrations.17 From the 91 firms interviewed, 42 
firms met this requirement. From the 42 firms, 33% used futures contracts. Table I shows the observed 
frequencies of firms having either cash contract relationships, forward contract relationships or cash 
contract relationships in combination with futures contracts. 
                                                                 
16 The data set contained information about the trading partner. Hence, the data are in a closed system 
format, in the sense that the two firms, concluding contracts, were in the data set. Such a close system 
provides the opportunity to validate the contract relationship mentioned by both firms. 
17 Our research design excludes firms that hedge for basis speculation reasons. 
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TABLE I 
Classification of Firms’ Contract Relationships and Use of Futures Contracts when  
Firm A Prefers a Cash Contract Relationship  
 Contract Preference and Power level of Firm B 
Contract 
relationship  
Forward 
contract and 
high power 
Forward 
contract and 
low power 
Cash contract 
and low power 
Cash contract 
and high 
power 
Cash contracting  
2 
 
1 
 
7* 
 
9* 
Forward 
contracting 
 
6* 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
Cash contracting 
and hedging 
services 
 
 
2 
 
 
8* 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
Correctly 
classified 
 
60% 
 
67%1 
 
78%1 
 
82%1 
An asterisk indicates the number of firms who have a contract relationship that is consistent with the 
proposed framework. 1Indicates that the percentage of correctly classified firms, based on the 
observed contract relationship, is significant at p < 0.05, employing a one-sample multinomial test (e.g. 
Bain and Engelhardt, 1987). 
 
As seen in Table I, the frequency of respondents that behave consistent with the theory is high, 
ranging from 60% to 82%, thereby, on face value, supporting the theory. The first data column 
in Table I reflects the situation of a firm who prefers a forward contract relationship and has 
relative power over the other firm who prefers a cash contract relationship. It is expected that in 
such a situation the firm exercises its power, and hence, will force a forward contract 
relationship with the other firm. Column two of Table I describes the situation as reflected in H1: 
the firm prefers a forward contract relationship, however the other firm prefers a cash contract 
relationship and is able to force such a relationship because it is more powerful. As predicted by 
the theory, the firm accepts the cash contract relationships and complements it with the hedging 
services offered by futures exchanges such that the hedging service plus the cash forward 
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contract relationship yields the same pay-off structure as a forward contract relationship. In 
columns three and four of Table I both firms prefer a cash contract relationship. In these cases a 
cash contract relationships is being established, as predicted by the theory. 
Using a one-sample multinomial test (e.g. Bain and Engelhardt, 1987), it was tested 
whether the correct classified contract relationships and futures usage employed by the firms 
according to the proposed theory are significant. There are c possible types of outcomes, A1, 
A2, ..., Ac. In the empirical study c = 3 and A1 = cash contract relationship; A2 = forward 
contract relationship; and A3 = cash contract relationship in combination with futures usage, with 
a sample of size n (the sum of a column in Table I). Let o1, ..., oc denote the frequency of 
observed outcomes for each situation (e.g., the columns in Table I). Assuming probabilities 
P(Aj) = pj, j = 1, ... c, where p jj
c
=å =1 1, the completely specified hypothesis H0: pj = pjo, j = 
1, ... c is tested. Under H0 the expected values for each type are given by ej = npjo. The chi-
square statistic can then be written as: 
c2 = ( ) /o e ej j jj
c -
=å 21 . 
The limiting distribution of this statistic is chi-squared with c - 1 degrees of freedom, so an 
approximate size a test is to reject H0 if c2 > c a1
2 1- -( )c . 
For three cases (the columns in Table I), the H0 is rejected at the 0.05 level of 
significance, supporting the proposed theory that futures contracts play a significant role in 
contract relationships among firms.18 In the case where the firm has high power and prefers 
                                                                 
18 The number of observations in the cells are rather low, thereby weakening the chi-square test. It is  
therefore emphasized that the empirical results must be viewed as an illustration, not a formal test. 
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forward contracts and the other firm prefers cash contracts, H0 is not rejected at the 0.05 level. 
The empirical results show, consistent with the proposed theoretical framework, that if firm A is 
more powerful than firm B and firm A prefers cash contracts, whereas firm B prefers forward 
contracts, a cash contract relationship will occur in which firm B buys hedging services to 
complement the price term of the cash contracts (column 3 in Table I). Also, if both firms prefer 
cash contracts, there is little use of hedging services. Likewise for firms preferring forward 
contracts with relatively high power. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The theory presented is a positive one (how do decision-makers behave), whereas some of the 
theories reviewed in the beginning of the paper have a normative character (how should 
decision-makers behave). In line with DeBondt and Thaler (1995) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), it is believed that a good finance theory is to be grounded on evidence 
about how people actually behave.  
While many firms physically operate independently, their behavior is influenced by the 
interaction and relationships among other firms with whom they do business. Although this has 
been generally accepted in economics and futures research (e.g., multi-product hedging models 
(Anderson and Danthine, 1980; Rolfo, 1980; Anderson and Danthine, 1981; Zilcha and Broll, 
1992)), it is surprising that none of the theories on the motivation for using futures take the 
commercial environment into account.19 In this paper the firm’s commercial environment is taken 
                                                                 
19 Williams (1986) did view the hedging operation in a broader way, but he did not include the interaction 
among firms into his analysis. 
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into account by focussing on the relationships of the firm with other firms in the marketing 
channel. The commercial environment is reflected in the other firm’s contractual relationship 
preference and the power balance in the relationship between the firms. In this framework it is 
argued that one of the reasons to hedge is the firm’s contract relationship preference, its 
commercial environment, reflected in the contract preferences of the other firm and the power 
balance between the firms. In this case, the motivation for firm A to use futures contracts is not 
only driven by characteristics of firm A, but is also heavily influenced by the trading environment 
and the power balance between firms. In the earlier work on the motivation to use futures, risk 
insurance or the risk-return trade-off was the reason to hedge. Hence, these theories do not 
address the role of the interaction between other firms for futures usage. In the proposed 
framework the need for risk reduction still plays a role as it may reflect the firm’s preferred 
contractual relationship, or the contract relationship preferred by the other firm. Hence, the 
proposed theory is a complement rather than an alternative theory to the existing ones. The 
proposed theory shows that futures markets affect the industrial organization of an industry; 
without the availability of hedging services some type of contract relationships may very well not 
exist. This finding is in line with Hirshleifer (1988) who argued that the presence or absence of a 
futures market affect how production is optimally organized. 
Telser (1981, p. 1) stated that futures markets facilitate trade among strangers. In this 
paper it is argued that futures markets facilitate contractual relationships among contract 
parties. Telser (1981, p. 1) also stated that “even if we accept the price insurance theory, it 
does not explain why an organized futures market is necessary in order to accommodate 
hedging. A merchant who wishes to avoid the price risks of holding inventories can do so 
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without an organized futures market. He can do so by entering into forward transactions in the 
cash market”. But is that true? Can a firm who wants a forward trade always make a forward 
trade? Power imbalances between trading partners may cause the relative powerfully trading 
partner to enforce a cash contract relationship on the other firm. Taking power into account 
seems to introduce a variable which is important when trying to understand firms’ contract 
relationships and hence the firms’ motivation to use futures. 
In line with Williams (1986), this paper views the total trade as one, that is the 
interaction with the other firms and the transactions in the futures market. The hedging operation 
is extended, thereby including the net of contract relationships of a firm which makes up his/her 
business. In a sense a portfolio approach is taken, but now the portfolio not only consists of 
actuals and futures but also of contract relationships. 
The perspective of the previous literature was primarily on commodity dealers, in which 
contract relationships were not at the center of focus. However, in an industrial marketing 
channel, contract relationships are the center of business. It is shown that the relatively powerful 
firm might enforce a contract relationship with the less powerful trading partner, which can result 
in a conflict situation that might lead to the termination of the contract relationship. It is shown 
that in this situation the services provided by futures exchanges can be used to solve the conflict. 
Hence, one of the firm’s motivations for using futures is to facilitate contract relationships. The 
illustration of futures used in the Dutch pork industry supports the theory. The theory of contract 
relationship management motivation predicts that those commodities which are traded in a 
marketing channel where there are differences in power level and contract relationship 
preferences between firms may develop active futures trading.  
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